Lindle~ (1957) In econometrics, "Lindley's paradox" (as it has become known statistics) has been explained in well known books by Zellner (1971) , Leamer (1978) and Judge et ai. (1982), but is not widely appreciated.
Introduction
Surveys in psychology, including most recently Nelson et al. (1986) , suggest that the great majority of researchers who use statistical tests of significance believe intuitively that the null hypothesis is discredited more convincingly by a larger sample (more powerful test) at the same level of significance.
In accounting, the evidential interpretation of tests is not often discussed, not at least in published research. But in a methodological paper written for research students, Burgstahler takes apparently the same position as those researchers surveyed in psychology:
For more powerful tests, there is a lower degree of belief in the null (and greater belief in the alternative) as a result of observation of a significant statistic. (Burgstahler, 1987, p.207) Burgstahler claims that a "significant" result represents stronger evidence the higher the power of the test. l Consistent with this conclusion, the suggestion by some researchers (Burgstahler gives references) that a given level of significance entails greater evidence against the null hypothesis when the sample is small (power is low) than when the sample is very large (power is high) is expressly denied:
... researchers may even mistakenly assert that a significant result from a low-power test is more convincing evidence against the null than a significant result from a high-power test because a more extreme test statistic is required to attain significance for a low-power test. (Burgstahler, 1987, p.207) Notwithstanding Burgstahler's anathema, it has been noted among theoretical statisticians at least since Lindley (1957) that under fairly general conditions the posterior probability of the null hypothesis, given a fixed level of significance P, increases (for a given prior) with the sample size n. Thus, a "significant" result is more compelling if the sample size is small than large. This is known as "Lindley's (or Jeffreys') paradox". References include Jeffreys (1939, pp.359-360) , Lindley (1957, pp.187-189) , Pratt (1961, pp.165-166; 1976, p.782; 1977, pp.63-67) , Edwards et al. (1963, pp.221-231) , Zellner (1971, pp.303-306; 1984, pp.276-279) , Rosenkrantz (1973, p.314; 1977, p.208) , Cox and Hinkley (1974, pp.395-397) , Basu (1975, pp.43-47) , Leamer (1978, pp.104-105) , Good (1980, pp.307-309; 1981, pp.163-164; 1982, p.342; 1983, pp.312-314; 1984, pp.300-302; 1985, p.260) , Hill (1982, p.345) , Judge et al. (1982, p.101) , Berger (1985, p.156) , DeGroot (1986, pp.449-450) , Royall (1986, pp.313-345) , Johnstone (1986, pp.493-494; 1989a, p.5; 1989c) , and Berger and Sellke (1987, p.112) . The passages quoted below are clear and authoritative:
Prior beliefs about the null hypothesis aside, bare significance at the 5% level does not contradict the null hypothesis equally as the statistical problem varies or as the sample size varies in a given problem (for instance, testing p=.5 against p=.6 with 10 or 1000 binomial observations). Consider also a most powerful level 5% test for a simple hypothesis against a simple alternative having power 99%: if the distributions are continuous, a result which is just significant can hardly be said to favor the alternative, since it is also just significant at level 1% when the hypotheses are reversed. In fact, the more powerful the test, the more a just significant result favors the null hypothesis. (Pratt, 1961, pp.165-166) ... the interpretation to be placed on the phrase "significant at 5%" depends on the sample size: it is more indicative of the falsity of the null hypothesis with a small sample than with a large one. (Lindley and Scott, 1984, p. 3) .
.. . as the sample size increases in testing precise hypotheses, a given P value provides less and less real evidence against the null.
( Berger and Sellke, 1987, p .136) [ Figure 1 about here]
.
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where B Pr{Holx} parameters a=3 and b=5 (note that the distribution shown has not been probability distribution described above, is given as follows:
by Figure 1 below, is proportional to a beta distribution with For more diffuse prior distributions, even those with a relatively high probability on 9 in the range . against HA: 9>.5, given the prior probability distribution presumed in equation (2) above, the result x=527(1037) in n=1000 (2000) trials has (one-sided) P-level equal to .05, but gives Bayesian posterior probability Pr{Holx}=.7546(.8269). Lindley (1957, p.190) notes that for more moderate sample sizes, such as those in tests (i) and (ii) compared in this paper, the conventional and Bayesian conclusions may often be consistent (although not often the same; the Bayesian inference is expressed as a probability on H o or on an interval around the null value of 9, whereas the orthodox inference is typically something less precise, such as a statement of the form "the null hypothesis is probably false", or "there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis"). Care should be taken, however, when the sample size is very large. See Johnstone (1989c) on the interpretation of large sample tests. but with the addition of Bayesian posterior probabilities corresponding to the P-levels stated. These probabilities are based, for convenience, on the prior distribution Pr{H oj=Pr{HAj=.5, where
Pr{HAI is distributed uniformly on .5<e~1, as per equation (2) above.
The sensitivity of the Bayesian results to the priors on which these are calculated is discussed in footnotes below. Table 1 Excerpt from Dodd et al. Table 6 All firms .7435
"Uo: 9 = .5 against 11A: 9> .5.
bBascd on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5, 11.
(a) The -1 to +1 Result. Here the orthodox and Bayesian inferences are consistent. The orthodox inference based on a P-level of .0031
is that there is strong evidence against the hypothesis tested;
either the hypothesis H o is false or an event of very low probability (p-level) has occurred, hence it may be inferred that H o is probably false or in some sense strongly discredited (this is classical Fisherian logic). Consistent with the orthodox result, the Bayesian posterior probability of the null hypothesis is only . In particular, the sample size must be accounted for in conjunction with the P-level reported. This is explained in just a few orthodox textbooks; notably, Cox and Hinkley (1974, pp. 397-398) , and Kendall and Stuart (1979, p.197) . See also Hodges and Lehmann (1954) , and Appendix B of this paper. The number of observations in the full sample falls from 283 to 210 when the 'busy' period [data for firms filing around March 30] is eliminated . . . The proportion of firms with negative abnormal returns in the period -1 to +1 increases from 58% to 61% .. which decreases the P value for the binomial test from 0.0031 to 0.0006. The proportion of negative returns in the asset realizing group in the same window rises to 67% from 60%, and the P value for the binomial test decreases from 0.0307 to 0.0049. Other P values are essentially unaltered. (p.28l
In this passage, the authors report changes in P-levels, but give no relevance to the corresponding changes in sample size. A lower p-Ievel is interesting in itself, but more so in conjunction with a smaller sample. In particular:
(i) the decrease in the P-level for all firms (-1 to +1) from .0031
to .0006 when the "busy" period is excluded strengthens the evidence against H o : 9=.5; not only is the P-Ievel smaller but so is the sample size. I? The probability of Ho given by equation (2) falls from .1194 (n=283, P-Ievel=.0031) to .0230 (n=210, P-level=.0006).
Similarly, Pr{Holx}, calculated as per equation (1), falls from .0536 to .0118.
(ii) the decrease in the P-level for asset realizing firms (-1 to +1) 
Conclusion
The result in a test of statistical significance should be interpreted with respect to the sample size. 5% in to-day's small sample does not mean the same as 5% in to-morrows large one. (Lindley, 1957, p. There is, however, no theoretical basis on which to fix ex with respect to n. In a decision theory approach, the test characteristic ex (defined as the probability of a type I error) is determined by reference to the loss function, but if the test is to be interpreted inferentially (e.g., "on the basis of the sample observed, the null hypothesis H o is highly improbable") rather than as a decision between alternate courses of action (e.g., accept or reject the account balance stated by the company audited) there is no particular decision contemplated and hence no loss function to which to refer.
It is not clear, therefore, without explicit Bayesian calculations, how to interpret a given level of significance in terms of evidence.
The sample size is important, but there is no formal relationship by which P-levels can be calibrated Bayesianly [Berger and Delampady (1987) pp.327-328; Berger and Sellke (1987) pp.13S-136, 138] . This is of great concern to those researchers who employ orthodox techniques, particularly tests of significance, yet think of themselves, at least in principle, as Bayesian; cf., Burgstahler (1987, p.204 ).
An orthodox P-level is a summary of data, but not in itself an
Inference is what one makes of that P-level.
The logical inference based on a reported P-level depends generally on whether the logic applied is orthodox (Fisherian) or Bayesian. In accounting, the paper by Burgstahler (1987) In particular, Bayesian theorists maintain that the larger the sample size, the weaker, generally, the evidence (against the null hypothesis) entailed by a given level of significance. This is of particular concern in relation to securities market based research in accounting and finance where some samples are immensely large [Ball and Foster (1982) cf., Berkson (1938, pp.526-527) and Hodges and Lehmann (1954, p.261) .
Moreover, if the sample size is sufficiently large, the orthodox (two-sided) 100(1-a)% confidence interval corresponding to the result (two-sided P-Ievel:a, n) is [9 0 , 9 0 +£] , where 9 0 i s the null (hypothesized) value of the unknown paramater 9, and £ (which may be negative) is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the sample size is very large, a result significant at say a:.05 (eg., a P-Ievel of say .04) may imply a confidence interval not including 9 0 , but so close to 90
and so short that if the true parameter 9 is included in that interval, the null hypothesis, H o : 9:90, is as good as correct for any practical purpose.
In a case such as this, it is more to the point to report the 100(1-a)% confidence interval (for a:.05 say) implied by the P-Ievel observed than the P-Ievel by itself. Generally, if the sample size is very large, a report which says that the observed P-Ievel is equal to .049, or,~ore ambiguously, that the particular sample observed is significant at a:.05, entails logically strong evidence of little or no real effect, but may not be interpreted as such by readers who routinely reject the (usually null) hypothesis of nil effect, or consider that hypothesis discredited, on seeing the locution "significant at a:.05". .56=20/36 (-1 to +1) and .53=19/20 (-2 to +2). Similarly, for n=19 the proportions of firms with negative returns implied by the P-levels stated are .63=12/19 (-1 to +1) and .58=11/19 (-2 to +2). In addition to these alterations, Table 2 includes the Bayesian posterior probability of H o' Pr(Holxl, calculated both from equations (1) and (2). Table 2 Dodd et al. "Binomiallcst of llo: 9 = .5 against HA: 9 > .5.
bBased on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5. 1].
cBased on the prior density function g(9) oc 9 2(1-9)4 over (.5, IJ. Note that the low posterior probability of the null hypothesis (-1 to +1) for the whole sample (for both priors) is attributable to firms in the litigation and asset realizing categories. For firms in the other categories, and for all firms over the wider observation interval, pr{Holx} is (for both priors) generally higher than Pr{H o}=.5, indicating that the Dodd et al. binomial tests tend to confirm the null hypothesis that positive and negative abnormal returns are equally likely for firms with qualified audit reports.
Appendix B
Classical levels of significance should be interpreted in relation to the size of the sample. The importance of the sample size can be demonstrated from a Bayesian perspective by comparing the posterior probability of the hypothesis tested, Pr{Holx}, conditioned on a fixed level of significance (P-level), over increasing values of the sample size n. Consider, for example, a (one-sided) test of significance on the null hypothesis H o : 9=9 0=.5 against H A: 9>90, given the model x Binomial (n,9), where n is the sample size, 9 is the probability of a "success" (9 is assumed constant from trial to trial), and x is the observed number of "successes" (x~n). This is the one-sided binomial test described by Dodd et al. Table 3 below shows the number and proportion of successes necessary to achieve given levels of significance . OS, .10, and .25 for increasing values of n , Table 3 Observed Proportion p Such That Level of Significance Equals P "The values of x given are those with P-levels closest to the stated levels. For n=20, the exact P-levels are .0577, .1316 and .2517.
For larger n, the exact P-levels arc very close to the levels stated, bRounded to four decimal places.
Note that as the sample size n increases, the proportion of successes p=x/n with P-level equal to a approaches 9 0=.5 (the higher a the closer {p: P-level=a} to 9 0), Intuitively, therefore, or in terms of the likelihood ratio, Pr{xIHo}/Pr{x\H a}, the higher n the wider the interval of alternative hypotheses 9E [9 a, 1], where 9 a>9 0, excluded or strongly refuted by a result just significant at a; cf., Good (1981, p.164) .
"Based on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5, I).
posterior distribution converges on H o : 8=8 0 , For example, assume the "objective" (impartial) prior probability distribution Pr{H o}=Pr{HA}=.5, where Pr{H A } is distributed according to g(8) uniformly over (.5,1] . Berkson (1942 , p.331) Neyman (1955 , Gibbons and Pratt (1975, p.21) , Birnbaum (1977, pp.37-38) , Pratt (1977, pp.64-65) and Johnstone (198ge cf., Johnstone (1989b) . See Seidenfeld (1979, pp.70-102) and Johnstone (1987a) inference, unless, of course, the laws of probability are ignored.
9.
Thus no allowance is made for the possibility that 9 is closer to .65 or .75 or higher. To a Bayesian this is dogmatic -the Bayesian principle is to give very unlikely values of 9 very small, but non-zero, prior probability. Otherwise, if the data strongly supports an improbable value of 9, the evidence will not be reflected in the posterior probability distribution;
mathematically, a value of 9 given zero prior weight gets zero posterior weight too, whatever the evidence.
10.
The function g represents the normalized prior density for 9 over 9>.5. Thus, g can be interpreted as the probability (density) of 9 given the condition that HA: 9>.5 is true.
11. Berger and Sellke (1987, pp.114-115) explain the use of priors with a "spike" of probability on 9 0. 
13.
The incomplete beta function was computed using a power series outlined by Kennedy and Gentle (1980, pp.104-107) .
14. This result is quite insensitive to the prior distribution on HA: 9>.5. Specifically, the posterior probability of Ho conventional levels such as a=5% should be interpreted not as (1979, pp.28-69) and Johnstone (1987b) .
20.
An invalid or inadequate model may reduce the power of a test [Lev and Ohlson (1982) p.270]. However, it is possible too that the power of the test (the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis conditional on a specified alternative) may increase; cf., Johnstone (1989d) . 
